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ABSTRACT 
The objective with this paper is to test whether there are spillovers and agglomeration 
effects in the Polish food, beverage and tobacco industries. But while most studies on 
spillovers in developing and transition countries focus on unidirectional spillovers, this 
study assumes that spillovers may be multidirectional and instead could be based on any 
kind of ‘community’ related to a geographic cluster or industry. Transition countries in 
Eastern Europe often invite investors in with open arms and ample tax holidays based on 
the assumption that they create jobs and their technology spills over on domestic firms’ 
own capabilities eventually. Preliminary results on horizontal spillovers in this paper 
show that this is not the case in the Polish food industry. It appears that foreign investors 
share their own ‘glocal’ network externalities, while production and productivity 
spillovers among domestic firms are confined to their own and often local networks. 
Preliminary results are robust in the sense that different analytical approaches (supply 
curve and production function) lead to a highly similar set of conclusions. The paper 
rounds of with a discussion of how then to justify the ample tax holidays that Poland 
offers to foreign investors in the special economic zones designated particularly to 
industrial development in a regional policy perspective. Future versions of the paper will 
test further the role of history, e.g. whether former state owned networks in fact could 
play a role to the formation of spillovers. Also the attempt will be to test for pecuniary 
spillovers in forward and backward linkages. 
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1.Introduction 
As the largest and highly ‘glocalised’ manufacturing industry in the largest transition 
country, having attracted more than 5 bln EURO in foreign investment (PAIZ, 2001a), 
the Polish food industry is expected to be a very relevant case to the absence or presence 
of spillovers associated with multinational activity in transition countries. But the study 
of spillovers, from the technologically competitive foreign owned firms, is combined 
with a more general study of spillovers among local producer communities in Polish food 
industry. This is relevant since foreign investors are only one brick in the larger puzzle of 
transformation to a market and cluster-based economy. Offering the myriad of 
decentralised information streams leading to the externalities and spillovers that the 
socialist system’s bureaucratic co-ordination mechanisms apparently failed to provide.  
 
In a political economy perspective it is at the same time relevant to inquire into the role 
of multinational firms in the construction of a decentralised market economy. If foreign 
investors offer few benefits beyond those internalised in the multinational firm, how can 
tax holiday and other regional and national policies towards attracting foreign investors 
then be justified? Should CEE governments take a more active approach to foreign 
participation in combination with for example regional policy to optimise their benefits 
from foreign direct investment (FDI)? 
 
Few of the available studies of transition countries are generally optimistic about the 
evidence and prospect for spillovers associated with FDI in the short to medium term (see 
Konings, 2001). This study takes the problems and questions identified in the literature 
one step further by testing for spillover at a much more particular level of the economy, 
and by discussing why spillovers only exist among certain quite closed communities and 
what must be done to improve the situation. The conclusions are not particular only to the 
Polish economy, but valid to any industrial upgrading context in transition and 
developing countries where similar national and regional policies (laissez-faire, relaxed 
taxation policy combined with special economic zones) towards foreign investors have 
been adopted. 
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Section 2 offers a short review of some literature on spillovers in the manufacturing 
industry in developed, developing and transition economies. The data on the Polish food 
industry is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the specific situation of the food 
industry in transition including the motives and impacts of foreign investors at the firm 
and industry level. Section 5 introduces the estimation strategies for testing the presence 
of spillovers. Results are reported in Section 6 followed by a discussion of Poland’s 
regional policy in section 7 and a set of preliminary conclusions are given in Section 8. 
 
2. Spillovers – myth or reality? 
The question of spillovers is a pandoras box, discussion of which promises to lead to few 
easy conclusions. The main problem with spillovers is their intangibility and hence the 
question of their measurability. Any study of spillovers will have to struggle with a large 
number of methodological problems as testified by past studies on spillovers (Blomström 
et al., 2001). However, the great occupation with spillovers, owes to a shared concern in 
society that they can provide a significant competitive edge to business and make the 
difference between regional prosperity and ruin. Classical economists were the pioneers 
of perceiving the relevance of spillovers to the workings of the market economy and 
distinguished between pecuniary (money-related) and non-pecuniary spillovers 
(Marshall, 1879). 
 
A major problem with spillovers is not only how we measure them, but also our 
perception of spillovers. Some studies of spillovers take a very narrow perspective, 
looking at unidirectional spillover, for example from better performing firms to poorer 
performing firms in terms of R&D and productivity levels (see e.g. Amir and Wooders, 
1998 or Haddad and Harrison, 1994). This allows mathematical and methodological 
rigor. Other studies are much broader assuming that spillovers are multidirectional and 
could develop through many forms of economic ‘communities’ such as industries or 
clusters that are geographicly confined. Porter (1990) is the best well-known example of 
such broader approach to spillovers. The main assumption behind spillovers is that they 
should have some kind of ‘catalysing cause’, and be associated with a ‘vehicle’ that can 
transport or communicate the spillovers from one place to another or from one firm to 
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another. Finally, a shared ‘language’ may be the lowest common denominator for 
spillovers taking place in practice or not.   
 
Typical catalysts could be multinational firms in developing countries or R&D 
performing firms in developed countries, with an obvious overlap between these two 
types of spillover catalysts. Other catalysts could be government policy, user-producer 
relations (linkages) (Lundvall, 1985 ) or simply proximity in physical space (geography).  
Where it could be added that the more catalysts the merrier – e.g. a multinational firm 
locating next to a domestic supplier would be the case of a combination of catalysts that 
increases the likelihood of spillovers taking place (Aitken et al, 1997).  
 
The vehicle or the driving force behind spillovers is strongly related to its ‘community’. 
Socialisation or interaction may often be necessary (Lundvall, 1985), why the classical 
economists viewed spillovers as geographicly confined. In a globalised world this is not 
necessarily the case, since communities can come into being beyond the confines of 
physical space.  However, globalisation has not reduced the importance of local space 
and local differences, but perhaps even made differences more visible. Socialisation of 
managers and employees can lead to spillovers through demonstration effects and 
exchange of knowledge. Turnover of employees among firms in the same location or 
industry is another often exemplified vehicle. Or the professional relations in a 
community of users and producers (Lundvall, 1985). Or finally, exchange of knowledge 
among firms that are loosely connected in a network of a lesser kind than an actual 
ownership structure (in which case spillovers are internalised and hence can no longer be 
classified as a real externality). 
 
Concerning the importance of a shared language it comes to no surprise that evidence 
from the spillover literature suggests that a large economic and technological distance 
between a multinational firm and its host country could decrease the likelihood of 
spillovers taking place (Teece, 1977). Most studies that find positive evidence of 
spillovers from multinational involvement are among OECD countries and firms (see e.g. 
Liu et al., 2000). However, there are also a few studies providing positive evidence for 
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developing and transition countries (see e.g. Blomström and Sjöholm, 1998). But even 
here authors have identified several cases of the importance of shared language (Kokko, 
1994), most pronounced in studies where the beneficiaries of spillovers in developing 
countries are isolated to the host country community of multinational firms (see Feinberg 
and Majumdar, 2001). However, the lack of spillovers is not necessarily the ‘fault’ or 
result of a purposeful approach to the host country of the MNC. Some authors suggest 
that host country policies towards foreign investors may be to blame at least partially for 
the absence of spillover effects (Feinberg and Majumdar, 2001). The necessity for a 
shared language is taken one step further by what Cohen and Levinthal (1989) calls the 
second phase of R&D – learning from the R&D of other firms, which necessitates that 
the recipient firm is capable of understanding the information disseminated by other 
R&D performing firms through investment in ‘absorptive’ capacity. Some studies use the 
technology gap as a measure of shared language (see e.g. Kokko, 1994) while other 
studies have used new investments as a measure of desire to learn (see e.g. Jensen, 2001). 
 
This study does not look in isolation on particular types of spillovers in terms of 
communities, catalysts or vehicles. For example, spillovers are assumed to take place 
within or between different types of communities. But the focus is on catalysts that are 
considered important: foreign firms and physical space. This does not mean that other 
possible catalysing forces are ignored such as privatisation (including new firms) or the 
former networks of state-owned firms. In terms of vehicles the broadest possible vehicle 
is chosen first, such as for example total output, rather than just foreign output. However, 
the methodology applied will set certain limits to the types of spillovers that it is possible 
to estimate. This paper version only looks at non-pecuniary spillovers while later versions 
also will attempt to estimate pecuniary spillovers or spillovers in the vertical linkages 
between firms. 
 
3. The data 
The data used in the present study is a sample that is not necessarily representative in 
terms of firm population distributions across various characteristics of ownership, branch 
and region in the Polish food industry. It is based on firm-level data extracted from the 
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Amadeus database confining the search to Poland and NACE industries 15 and 16. This 
data was subsequently combined with information on ownership and size of investment 
from PAIZ’s list of major foreign investors. The original list extracted from Amadeus in 
May 2002 includes 749 firms of which more than 100 firms were immediately excluded 
because of insufficient information, or because the firms did not have food processing as 
primary activity. Observations for 1992 and 2001 were also removed initially because of 
their low number, limiting the time period of analysis to: 1993-2000.  
 
Furthermore, some firms are late entrants into the sample, while other firms are slow to 
publish new data. This gives an unbalanced panel with variability in the firm population 
covered for individual years as shown in Table 1. Observations are few and 
representation is low especially for the first two years of sampling: 1993 and 1994. 
Subsequently number of firms or potential number of observations stabilise around 550. 
Presently the real number of firms in the population is not known. In actual estimations 
the number of observations are further reduced and depending on estimation strategy, 
because of missing observations for individual firm-specific variables (see also below).  
 
TABLE 1: Data sample in population, estimated with turnover data   
Year    1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  
 
Simple average, in % 21 17 44 54 62 54 61 61 
   
Mean (Branch-level), in % 26 50 65 65 67 59 73 61 
 
SD (Branch-level), in % 27 96 84 63 58 36 53 33 
 
Sample firms, no. of  70 84 432 507 585 594 556 549 
 
Population    ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
Source: Amadeus and EFFECT/GUS. 
 
As a second step, data will be obtained from the Polish Privatisation Agency to include 
more information about year of privatisation of individual firms and further ownership 
characteristics.  
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TABLE 2: Descriptive statistics by year, current prices            
OBS:  Mean  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  
(SD)  
Turnover, 1000 PLN 70:  84,042 83:  70,701 204:  95,543 355:  94,286 462:  101,728 458:  103,787 483:  113,448 435:  140,144 
   (104,354) (118,254) (134,275) (184,640) (212,383) (237,154) (263,189) (286,942) 
Labour, no. of employees 0  0  226:  272 491:  367 582:  350 591:  336 551:  340 547:  332 
       (416)  (403)  (372)  (338)  (382)  (363) 
Fixed assets, 1000 PLN 42:  20,272 82:  20,250 204:  23,487 355:  22,478 429:  22,738 457:  28,718 484:  31,716 435:  38,491 
   (24,233)  (30,840)  (33,530)  (36,716)  (40,133)  (63,653)  (76,005)  (101,999) 
FDI, mln USD  9:  100  16:  52  44:  49  52:  50  54:  55  50:  59  52:  58  55:  55 
   (152)  (125)  (108)  (102)  (106)  (109)  (107)  (104) 
Taxes, 1000 PLN  13:  12,700 39:  22,687 203:  1,869 355:  1,833 430:  1,629 458:  1,526 483:  1,604 435:  1,209 
   (27,222)  (90,374)  (4,017)  (4,481)  (5,679)  (6,935)  (8,247)  (4,254) 
Cost of mat., 1000 PLN 24:  18,378 46:  34,038 77:  56,776 104:  32,530 168:  41,609 168:  42,469 237:  39,568 216:  48,225 
   (15,284)  (45,906)  (129,030) (35,406)  (45,635)  (50,041)  (54,030)  (53,342) 
Wages, 1000 PLN 23:  4,283 46:  6,438 77:  5,023 104:  3,697 166:  5,462 167:  5,422 237:  6,817 216:  7,868 
   (2,600)  (6,678)  (4,826)  (3,325)  (6,300)  (6,669)  (9,395)  (10,336) 
Value added, 1000 PLN 12:  22,172 24:  54,108 51:  13,187 66:  8,960 100:  14,650 115:  10,392 149:  14,969 159:  15,188 
   (34,421)  (138,907) (20,725)  (11,388)  (26,387)  (19,858)  (36,101)  (27,336) 
ROA, %   12:  27  36:  23  202: 8  353:  8  429:  4  456:  3  481:  -1  431:  2 
   (25)  (24)  (14)  (16)  (16)  (19)  (20)  (17) 
Age   70:  61  84:  45  432:  39  507:  38  585:  37  594:  35  556:  36  549:  37 
   (56)  (51)  (52)  (51)  (50)  (49)  (51)  (51)   
 
Total no. of firms  70  84  432  507  585  594  556  549 
 
No. of foreign firms 27  33  81  97  102  101  102  110 
 
No. of new firms  21  35  186  221  270  285  270  259 
 
No. of new foreign firms 9  16  41  52  57  59  59  63 
 
No. of acquired firms 18  17  40  45  45  42  43  47 
 
No. of state owned firms ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?   
 
  9
TABLE 2: Concluded                
No. of firms by branch  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  
1511-Meat  7  10  51  57  60  62  58  55 
1512-Poultry  1  4  19  21  24  24  24  23 
1513-Meat and Poultry 3  2  20  25  26  28  26  30 
1520-Fish  1  1  11  11  13  13  13  12 
1531-Potatoes  0  0  7  7  9  9  8  9 
1532-Fruit  1  2  7  11  11  13  9  8 
1533-Fruit and Vegetables 3  6  29  37  48  49  48  42 
1543-Margarine  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
1551-Dairy prod.  2  2  58  61  73  74  66  69 
1552-Ice cream  0  0  5  6  6  7  8  9 
1560-Milling  1  1   1  1  1  1  0  0 
1561-Grain mill products 1  1  27  30  33  34  27  25 
1562-Starch products 0  0  0  1  2  2  2  2 
1571-Prep.animal feeds 1  3  10  14  18  21  19  18 
1572-Pet foods  1  2  3  3  3  3  3  3 
1581-Bread and pastry 0  3  21  25  29  29  27  26 
1582-Biscuits and pastry 5  7  12  13  16  16  16  15 
1583-Sugar   8  7  33  55  66  66  66  69 
1584-Chocolate  5  8  24  29  33  34  30  28 
1585-Macaroni  0  1  3  3  3  3  2  3 
1586-Tea and coffee 0  2  7  7  7  7  6  6 
1587-Condiments 2  1  5  6  6  6  6  6 
1588-Dietic food  0  0  2  2  2  2  2  2 
1589-Other products nes 2  0  8  9  12  12  12  11 
1591-Dist. alcohol 8  0  16  16  16  13  16  17 
1592-Ethyl alcohol 1  0  4  4  4  3  4  4 
1593-Wine  0  0  1  2  2  2  1  1 
1594-Cider  1  3  8  8  10  9  9  9 
1595-Fermented beverages0  0  1  1  1  0  1  1 
1596-Beer  11  13  20  20  22  22  20  21 
1597-Malt  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
1598-Mineral water 0  1  10  13  19  20  16  13 
1600-Tobacco  4  2  7  8  9  9  9  10  
Source: Amadeus and EFFECT/GUS. 
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An estimation of data representation in the whole population is given in Table 1. It shows 
the median and variation in the sample’s turnover to global turnover at the branch-level 
for each of the years 1993-2000. Approximately 60% of branch-level turnover is covered 
with this data for most of the years, even though the standard deviation reveals quite large 
differences in coverage of individual branches (see also the second part of Table 2).  
 
There are several apparent biases in the data, related to the data source.  This type of 
database is biased towards the larger firms in the global population simply because they 
are more likely to publish an annual report. Furthermore, since Amadeus is based on the 
availability of such information, it is also likely that the sample shows a bias towards 
better performing firms or firms trying to attract outsider investors, and in particular 
towards firms listed on the stock exchange. Other possible biases include 
overrepresentation of firms in the more important regions and overrepresentation of firms 
that have been privatised to a final ownership group (terminal privatisation).  
 
It is difficult to judge whether foreign investors generally seek less publicity in terms of 
annual reports and a database like Amadeus when operating in Poland. Typically the 
parent firm will already be registered in Amadeus. This could also make it easier for 
database researchers to obtain data on foreign subsidiaries. Compared to PAIZ’s list of 
major investors it is obvious that some important investors are not included in the sample. 
According to PAIZ’s list approximately 85% of major investments and 65% of large 
projects in food processing are covered with the sample detracted from Amadeus. The 
bias towards larger projects is obvious and further pronounced by the fact that PAIZ’s list 
only includes 107 projects out of an estimated total of 489 foreign investors projects in 
the food processing industries (PAIZ, 2001a). Since smaller investors going in with less 
than 1 mln USD are not included in the PAIZ list.  
 
Hence it is difficult to judge on the basis of the available information whether foreign 
investors are over- or underrepresented in the sample data. 
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Descriptive statistics for the Amadeus data are shown in Table 2. Some variables are 
scarcely available for the first two years, 1993 and 1994, most dramatically exemplified 
with zero observations for labour. Effectively meaning that as the analysis draws on this 
variable it only covers the years after 1994. This is not so unfortunate as it minimises 
potential problems associated with an unbalanced panel because the panel tends to 
stabilise after 1994. Other variables are avoided in the subsequent analysis because they 
register few observations across all years such as cost of materials, wages and value 
added. 
 
Finally, a few other variables obtained from GUS through the firm EFFECT have been 
added to the database. Firstly the price indices of individual branches in food processing 
were obtained, whereby all data in current prices can be deflated to real value. Secondly a 
series of retail prices on various food products were obtained from EFFECT covering the 
period 1993-2000, information that is necessary towards the calculation of output and in 
the estimation of supply curves (see also Appendix Table A1). Thirdly as already 
mentioned above, the global value of production (turnover) in the population is known 
from the GUS data obtained. Hereby each observation can be juxtaposed with the 
aggregate turnover of the corresponding branch. This is important information towards 
the estimation of spillovers in later sections.  
 
4. Dimensions of transition in the food industry 
This section will discuss dimensions of transition that are considered salient to the future 
competitiveness of the food industry in the CEE region. Stylised facts introduced in this 
section will inform the analysis in later sections. 
 
The first important dimension is the privatisation of enterprises in the food processing 
industries. In principle this dimension should also consider the privatisation of land. But 
opposite most other transition countries, Poland did not face problems of privatising land 
used in agricultural production since this was in most cases never nationalised. However, 
this also means that Poland faces more severe structural problems in agriculture due to 
the low intensity and small plot size employed by individual farms. These structural 
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problems are also likely to feed over to difficulties related to the linkages between 
agriculture and food processing and hence also the efficiency of the latter.  For example, 
fragmentation of food processing in Poland relative to other CEE countries may be one 
symptom of this general problem (Duponcel, 1998). Privatisation in Poland has followed 
along two main lines: privatisation to outsiders including sales of enterprises to foreign 
investors and mass privatisation (Blaszczyk and Woodward, 1999). The SMEs have, 
however, often been privatised to insiders. In this sense the food industry is no exception 
from the general privatisation path in Poland (Duponcel, 1998), since one will typically 
find a mixture of both outsider owned, foreign owned, mass privatised (often being a 
non-terminal kind of privatisation which eventually will go over to other types of 
ownership including outsider dispersed shareholders) and management and employee 
owned firms. Few firms in the Amadeus sample are SMEs, and hence the influence of 
insider ownership on results is likely to be very small. The impact foreign ownership has 
on firm performance, including the general impact of privatisation methods employed 
and the emergence of a new private sector, are viewed as factors of particular importance 
to the tests of spillovers in later sections. Furthermore, privatisation including the new 
private sector is not only important to present day resources, management and corporate 
governance of the individual firm, but also important in the sense of informing us about 
the past history, former linkages and old networks of the firm. 
 
Therefore, the second salient dimension of transition is the disorganisation or 
reorganisation of vertical linkages between firms in the value added chains of the food 
industry. Prior to transition, there was a very strong vertical integration of the value 
added chain in the food industry. Transition is therefore likely to bring about more 
focussed firms and catalyse the importance of external linkages between firms. 
Furthermore, the whole linkage process is being liberalised, as linkages between firms 
under socialism typically were shaped by vertical communication structures. 
Momentarily the changes caused by liberalisation led to a disorganisation of production 
and hold-up problems (Gow and Swinnen, 1998). These problems have been viewed as 
one of the most important explanatory factors of the resulting economic depression in the 
beginning of the 1990s. More optimistically, one may, however, view this process as one 
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of restructuring and reorganisation increasing the likelihood of the emergence of a more 
globally competitive food industry. Transition is therefore a period of tearing down old 
and building up new linkages, both horizontally and vertically between firms. The 
transition period should therefore likely be one that is potentially associated with vast 
opportunities for spillovers and learning across firms, and especially among firms having 
experienced terminal privatisation, including solving their resource constraints and 
managerial incentive problems. 
 
The third important dimension is the question of changes in geographic concentration of 
the food industry due to the introduction of free-market forces, privatisation and the 
liberalisation of linkages between firms. However, the expected outcome of transition for 
changes in industry location depends very much on whether goals of regional self-
sufficiency or goals of scale economies prevailed and informed the decisions of planners 
under the former socialist regime. This varies even for the food industry across individual 
transition countries. The food industry in Poland is in general claimed to have been more 
fragmented compared to other CEE countries (Duponcel, 1998), meaning that goals of 
regional self-sufficiency are likely to have prevailed over other goals. This is seen in 
some branches such as sugar processing where a high number of firms share the same 
name except a regional subtitle. However, in many other cases concerns over scale 
economies are also likely to have been prioritised by Polish planners. Unfortunately, it 
was not possible so far to obtain data for the regional distribution of food production 
prior to the transition. However, the available sample does give some indication about the 
tendencies in the changes introduced with the transition for geographic concentration. 
The impression is that the changes in the geographic composition of production in the 
food industry are quite high within a short time span of only 5 years (1995-2000). Figures 
rendering an estimate hereof are give in Tables 3 and 4, all based on the Amadeus sample 
and hence not necessarily representative for the global population of firms in Polish food 
processing. Estimates for the regional distribution of turnover in Table 3 suggests a 
stronger polarisation between regions over the years 1995-2000. Some regions gain, and 
in particular the hub around the capital. Other regions fall slightly back, most impressive 
in the case of the hub around Poznan.  
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TABLE 3: Estimated regional distribution of turnover in food processing  
TURNOVER in 1000 PLN, current prices 
 
Region    All firms, 1995  All firms, 2000  Foreign firms, 2000 
 
1. Zachodnio-pomorskie  941,374 (5%)  2,338,778 (4%)  880,963 (3) 
2. Pomorskie   641,884 (3)  1,696,682 (3)  670,367 (2) 
3. Warminsko-Mazurskie 783,884 (4)  3,806,128 (6)  3,167,868 (9) 
4. Podlaskie   867,317 (5)  2,152,029 (4)  231,723 (1) 
5. Lubuskie   924,534 (5)  1,295,325 (2)  222,410 (1) 
6. Wielkopolskie (Poznan hub) 4,342,914 (22)  9,347,525 (15)  6,204,348 (18) 
7. Kujawsko-pomorskie   1,235,388 (6)  3,507,064 (6)  1,138,647 (3) 
8. Mazowieckie (Warszawa hub) 4,266,758 (22)  16,560,125 (27)  10,666,133 (32) 
9. Dolnoslaskie   823,416 (4)  1,705,624 (3)  238,532 (1) 
10. Lodzkie   1,099,383 (6)  2,371,868 (4)  704,997 (2) 
11. Lubelskie   870,130 (4)  2,156,358 (4)  330,647 (1) 
12. Opolskie   153,701 (1)  813,958 (1)  229,821 (1) 
13. Slaskie   848,369 (4)  4,630,105 (7)  2,481,703 (7) 
14. Switokrzyskie  335,165 (2)  328,403 (1)  76,951 (0) 
15. Podkarpackie   716,231 (4)  1,930,998 (3)  911,333 (3)  
16. Malopolskie   641,244 (3)  6,321,700 (10)  5,570,537 (16)   
 
TOTAL    19,491,692  60,962,670  33,726,980  
Source:  Amadeus. 
 
The data in Table 3 also suggest, that in particular the foreign firms have a large impact 
on the geographic reorganisation of the food industry. Wielkopolskie (Poznan hub) is the 
only case where the whole region does not go forth in combination with a quite strong 
concentration of foreign activities in the same region. The immediate observation is 
therefore that transition has led to a stronger concentration of activities in Polish food 
processing. 
 
But the picture looks slightly different when considering the data on the geographic 
concentration of individual branches as calculated with the Gini coefficients in Table 4 
(on application of Gini coefficients to geographic concentration, see Shelburn and 
Bednarzik, 1993). A Gini coefficient close to 1, means that there is a very strong 
geographic concentration of a specific branch in one region, in fact a Gini of 1 means that 
the particular branch is only located in one region. Oppositely does a Gini coefficient 
close to 0 represent the opposite case of a branch dispersed exactly equal among all 
regions. Again the figures are estimates based on the available data from the Amadeus 
sample. Since the standard deviation for representation of individual branches in the 
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sample in 1995 is quite high, this may have some unintentional effects for the Ginis in 
Table 4 and hence reinforce the trend that is observed. Table 4 suggests that there are 13 
branches experiencing declining geographic concentration, 6 branches with increasing 
geographic concentration and 7 branches with unchanged geographic concentration. In all 
cases except tobacco the foreign firms are more geographicly concentrated amongst 
themselves than is the case for all the sampled firms. 
 
TABLE 4: Gini estimates for geo-concentration at four-digit branch level  
Branch    All firms, 1995  All firms, 2000  Foreign firms, 2000 
 
1511-Meat   0.319    0.338 (15)  - 
1512-Poultry   0.673 (1)  0.471 (3)  0.796 (1) 
1513-Meat and Poultry  0.486 (5)  0.371 (3)  0.646 (5) 
1520-Fish   0.931 (1)  0.943 (2)  - 
1531-Potatoes   0.929 (12)  0.547 (4)  - 
1532-Fruit   0.974 (14)  0.665 (14)  - 
1533-Fruit and Vegetables  0.406 (12)  0.541 (15)  0.675 (15) 
1543-Margarine   -   -   - 
1551-Dairy prod.   0.503 (4)  0.448 (12)  0.545 (12) 
1552-Ice cream   0.777 (6)  0.907 (9)  0.959 (7) 
1560-Milling   -   -   - 
1561-Grain mill products  0.614 (14)  0.653 (7)  - 
1562-Starch products  -   0.972 (9)  - 
1571-Prep.animal feeds  0.896 (5)  0.675 (10)  0.854 (5) 
1572-Pet foods   0.897 (7)  0.898 (7)  0.916 (7) 
1581-Bread and pastry  0.795 (9)  0.489 (8)  0.546 (16) 
1582-Biscuits and pastry  0.803 (16)  0.701 (10)  0.937 (10) 
1583-Sugar   0.717 (11)  0.531 (14)  0.762 (14) 
1584-Chocolate   0.557 (16)  0.520 (12)  0.591 (8) 
1585-Macaroni   -   0.935 (2)  - 
1586-Tea and coffee  0.742 (1)  0.812 (1)  - 
1587-Condiments  0.733 (7)  0.677 (6)  - 
1588-Dietic food   0.962 (2)  0.960 (2)  - 
1589-Other products nes  0.925 (12)  0.597 (12)  0.886 (13) 
1591-Dist. Alcohol  0.385 (2)  0.585 (4)  0.963 (2) 
1592-Ethyl alcohol  0.866 (5)  0.890 (5)  - 
1593-Wine   -   -   - 
1594-Cider   0.867 (16)  0.792 (11)  - 
1595-Fermented beverages -   -   - 
1596-Beer   0.565 (3)  0.609 (13)  0.677 (13) 
1597-Malt   -   -   - 
1598-Mineral water  0.745 (11)  0.511 (8)  0.981 (11) 
1600-Tobacco   0.624 (6)  0.533 (16)  0.516 (16)  
Source:  Amadeus. 
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Combining the information obtained from Table 3 and 4 shows that: 
1) the food industry as a whole is becoming more regionally concentrated, but that 
the location of individual branches in most cases not is getting more concentrated, 
hence suggesting the emergence of clusters based on linkages between firms in 
different branches.  
2) foreign firms tend to locate amongst themselves and somewhat differently as a 
group compared to domestic firms, for example, they tend to concentrate more 
along the eastern or western borders of Poland than domestic firms, very likely 
because the foreign owned firms are much more trade intensive and oriented 
towards either the EU or Russian markets. (But also because they are impacted by 
regional policies in their location decision as discussed in Section 7.) 
 
This leads us to the final dimension of transition salient to the development of the food 
industry: the liberalisation of FDI and foreign trade. FDI is viewed by most observers of 
the transition economies as most salient to fast and successful restructuring of ailing 
industries (Duponcel, 1998, Josling et al., 1997). Foreign investors potentially bring with 
them capital, new technology, terminal privatisation and effective corporate governance, 
market access, including training and spillovers through both horizontal and vertical 
linkages. The food industry is no exception and some case studies suggest that there are 
important spillovers in particular among communities of users and producers (Gow and 
Swinnen, 1998). Prospects for FDI and reintegration into the international trading system 
are therefore also strongly intertwined at the moment. A major challenge is, however, 
also to have domestic firms upgrade their export capabilities. It may be an easier strategy 
of Polish firms to be integrated into the value added chains controlled by multinational 
firms. However, the upgrading resultant hereof will depend on actual spillovers to 
domestic firms. 
 
The Polish food industry is the greatest attractor of FDI among all industrial destinations 
in the CEE region. The industry has received 33% of all investments in Polish 
manufacturing or approximately 15-20% of total FDI in Poland since the outset of the 
transition (PAIZ, 2001b). Furthermore, the Amadeus sample in Table 3 above suggests 
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that up to 50% of turnover is produced by foreign owned entities at the end of 2000. The 
penetration of the food industry in Poland by foreign investors is only surpassed by 
Estonia and Hungary in terms of foreign market shares (Duponcel, 1998).  
 
Studies by Walkenhorst (2000, 2001) on the motives and home country geopgrahy of 
foreign investors in Polish food processing suggest that they can be broadly placed in two 
groups:  
 
1) strategic and market-seeking investors in monopolistic industries, from a quite 
diverse group of home countries, with high value added activities who concentrate 
upgrading efforts on the final value added stages of production,  
2) cost-seeking, natural resource-seeking and export-oriented investors, which in 
terms of home countries tend to come from the EU, with activities in the more 
traditional staple food branches and hence in industries more likely to be 
characterised by perfect competition. 
 
These different motives may also affect the investors’ location strategy as discussed in 
Section 7. Furthermore, Walkenhorst (2000, 2001) finds evidence of complementarity 
between FDI and trade in the case of Polish food processing, suggesting an already quite 
high degree of integration between processing activities in Eastern and Western Europe. 
Investors from the EU, and especially neighbouring France and Germany are highly 
dominant investors (Walkenhorst, 2000, PAIZ, 2001b). This, however, also implies that 
food processing is typically quite import intensive in Eastern Europe and hence FDI does 
not necessarily have an overall positive effect on the Polish trade balance in food 
products.  
 
Transition implies greater international involvement or globalisation of the Polish food 
industry, including a much stronger move to involvement in international trade and 
specialisation which should increase geographic concentration and hence also the 
potential for spillovers (Shelburn and Bednarzik, 1993). 
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5. Estimation strategy 
There are various possibilities to estimate spillovers using regression analysis, where the 
two most traditional and theory-based approaches are the estimation of the firm’s 
production function and the firm’s supply curve derived from the profit maximising 
condition (Levin and Reiss, 1988). In both cases the spillover argument is based on the 
assumption that the firm’s own production or supply decision is not uniquely decided by 
internal conditions, but dependent on the activities of other firms in the same or related 
branches of industry. In relation to the supply curve derivation, the spillover effect is 
assumed to go beyond the traditional output responses of firm in monopolistic 
competition. In relation to the production function specification, the spillover effect is 
related to the technology or total factor productivity, where the latter is assumed to be 
decomposable into elements associated with both firm internal and external influences on 
its technology and hence productivity performance. For example, in the original Solow 
specification technology is assumed to be a public good. This would be a case of no 
appropriation of technology at the firm-level. In practice, this can be a highly unrealistic 
assumption, depending on the type of industry, the prevailing economic system and the 
importance of firm-specific knowledge and technological leverage to competition. There 
is also a quite strong connection between the empirical literature on spillovers and that on 
learning-by-doing (for an overview see Madsen et al., 2002), however, the latter being 
based essentially on dynamic arguments which is not the case in the spillover literature. 
Recently more ad-hoc approaches are also adopted, especially because of the increasing 
availability of qualitative data based on innovation surveys (see Kaiser, 2002). In the 
literature on developing and transition countries the production function approach is 
dominant, possibly due to poor availability of reliable price information.  
 
Here both approaches will be used as part of a common estimation strategy. Only using 
the supply curve estimations makes results highly vulnerable to pricing information that 
is somewhat imperfect for some of the branches. At the same time the availability of data 
on value added is so poor that the production function estimations are adopted on the 
second best assumption that cost of materials and other inputs asides capital and labour 
can be ignored, i.e. turnover must be used instead of value added in the estimations. 
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Estimation of the supply curve is derived from the profit maximising condition. As in 
Aitken et al. (1997) it is assumed that there are externalities associated with producing in 
the same branch as other firms (in Aitken et al. there is tested for externalities associated 
with exporting), however, no inference is made ex ante about who catalyses the 
spillovers. It is simply assumed according to the learning-by-doing literature that the 
firm’s own production performance not only depends on its own output decision and 
internal conditions, but on the aggregate output decision of the whole branch or industry. 
No implicit assumption is made about the type of competition, as it may typically vary 
across the branches included under food processing, however, the standard output 
response to the output decision of other firms that goes through the price-output 
relationship is modelled by including the demand equation in a two equation system. The 
intuitive interpretation of the role of spillovers to the supply curve is that if there are 
spillovers an increase in aggregate output (so far only horizontal or in the same branch) 
will make the supply curve shift outwards. One can chose to assume that this is due to 
cost-reducing or demand-creating spillovers, with either type of spillover having the same 
effect on the supply curve. In practice the relevance of either argument will depend on the 
particular type of competition and whether firms produce goods that are differentiated by 
consumers. Thus the supply curve and a very simple demand curve is estimated using the 
following specification: 
 
The first equation being a simple ‘demand’ curve expression, where price is expected to 
depend negatively on the aggregate output at the horizontal or branch-level HQ. The 
second equation is the supply curve, which is expected to vary positively with the real 
price p, firm size as estimated with number of employees L and positively with the 
corrected aggregate horizontal output HQ* (HQ deducted the firm’s own output), the 
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firm’s age, type of ownership and whether it is a new firm. Fixed effects are only 
specified down to the branch and regional level in this preliminary paper using dummies 
B and R for the 30 branches and 16 regions in the data, i.e. branches have individual 
intercepts. Future versions should try to adopt fixed effect for individual firms also. 
Testing for localised spillovers can easily be done with this specificiation through a 
narrowing down of the HQ* that one assumes belongs to the relevant community. 
 
Estimation of the production function is based on Blomström and Sjöholm (1998) whom 
take outset in a derived form with labour productivity on the left-hand side and allowing 
for scale economies through the labour term on the right-hand side. Again the possible 
presence of spillovers is tested by inclusion of a variable accounting for aggregate 
horizontal production, but here captured with turnover instead of output. 
 
The specification takes the following form: 
 
With Y/L and K/L standing for labour productivity and the capital-labour ratio 
respectively. Labour productivity is expected positively related to capital intensity. 
Labour L captures whether individual firms are producing on the part of the production 
curve that exhibits negative or positive scale economies. Except for these variables and 
the slightly adjusted spillover variable, all other variables are the same as used in the 
supply curve estimation discussed above. 
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6. Results 
Table 1 shows results for the supply curve estimations. Results for the first equation in 
the system – the demand curve are not reported. R2 is above 50% and the relationship 
between price and quantity is negative and highly significant as expected in all the 
versions of the demand curves corresponding to the supply curve equations reported here. 
The estimated supply equation (equation 1) suggests that supply in general is elastic 
(elasticity slightly below 1) with respect to Polish retail prices. A one percent increase in 
price increases supply with 0.9 percent. Firm size as measured with labour L also affects 
the supply response of the individual firm positively as expected. Furthermore, a dummy 
for foreign ownership was included. Presently, the analysis of ownership is not 
particularly deep since information on privatisation at this stage is insufficient. However, 
foreign ownership also has a positive effect on output response, and on top of size. This is 
because of the higher productivity per worker in foreign owned firms. However, since the 
transition literature indicates that new firms in general are doing better than the old firms 
struggling with their socialist past (WB, 2001), it was also chosen specifically to use a 
dummy to control for this influence both in relation to the age / inherited capabilities of 
the firm and other ownership controls such as foreign ownership. Results obtained for the 
age dummy and age variables in combination are intuitively straightforward. There is 
some advantage to being a new firm as seen both with a positive sign for the dummy and 
a negative sign for the age variable. However, the typical relationship that we would 
expect is not lost since despite the advantages of being new, age appears to do matter to 
supply capabilities also among firms with a socialist past. Thus we obtain both traditional 
results as we would expect for any firm (that firms accumulate capabilities over time) and 
further results consistent with the influence that transition has on reshuffling fortunes and 
misfortunes of firms with the likelihood of fortunes going more in the direction of the 
newly created firms.   
 
It is somewhat a mistake in the initial supply curve estimations that a standard fixed 
effect model was not chosen. Since there are obvious differences between individual 
firms, such as the quality of their managers (Verbeek, 2000), which are suspected to vary 
for the cross-section. But less likely to vary over a short time series as the present one 
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where most of the firms in the sample are suspected to have experienced terminal 
privatisation. 
 
REG. TABLE 1: Supply curve estimation (2SLS)      
Dependent variable is firm-level output: log quantity 
 
   EQ 1  EQ 2  EQ 3  EQ 4  EQ 5 
Explaining variables:       (FOR=1)             (FOR=0) 
log PRICE (PER KG) 0.923  0.077  0.923  0.247  0.909 
   (8.58)  (0.69)  (8.57)  (2.18)  (7.08) 
log SIZE (LABOUR) 0.739  0.614  0.739  0.552  0.695 
   (26.07)  (31.21)  (26.04)  (15.85)  (20.62) 
NEW FIRM (D)  0.136  0.117  0.123  0.515  0.071 
   (1.81)  (2.34)  (1.54)  (4.64)  (0.80) 
log AGE  -0.142  -0.148  -0.145  -0.070  -0.111 
   (-2.67)  (-4.16)  (-2.70)  (-0.91)  (-1.85) 
log AGE2  0.257  0.267  0.262  0.175  0.237 
   (2.43)  (3.79)  (2.46)  (1.34)  (1.95) 
FOREIGN (D)  0.525  0.389  0.527  -  - 
   (9.07)  (9.97)  (7.91) 
BRANCH OUTPUT  0.501  0.084  0.501  0.149  0.506 
   (33.51)  (1.75)  (33.46)  (5.75)  (26.15) 
TIME TREND   0.034  -0.017  0.033  0.014  0.026 
   (2.27)  (-1.39)  (2.23)  (0.87)  (1.55) 
 
REGIONS (D15)  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
BRANCHES (D29) YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
             
Output concentration variables (localised spillover proxies): 
 
FOR-REG  -  0.103  -  -  - 
     (1.87) 
NEW-REG  -  0.152  -  -  - 
     (2.60) 
REG-BRA  -  0.341  -  -  - 
     (20.84) 
FOR-REG-BRA  -  -  -0.000  0.542  -0.003 
       (-0.06)  (17.81)  (-0.95) 
NEW-REG-BRA  -  -  0.001  -0.007  0.003 
       (0.47)  (-1.21)  (0.73)  
R21/   0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99 
N   2148  2148  2148  441  1707  
1/  The definition of R2 is changed to 1-(Residual Sum of Squares/Uncorrected Total Sum of Squares)   
 
 
The spillover variable which in the supply curve estimations is the aggregate horizontal 
output of other firms, renders results which are very good at the most aggregate level (the 
national level). However, since the demand curve is only stated in a very basic version, 
not taking into account income levels or consumer spending patterns, it is possible that 
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this variable captures such influence. This could in principle be anything that the same 
branch has in common and may explain some of the large size and significance obtained 
for this variable. Despite such possible error in the estimations, the result suggests, that 
firms equal on all the other variables included in the estimations, in fact enjoy a better 
output response in those cases where their branch is generally larger in terms of aggregate 
output. This effect is similar to that of a country having comparative or competitive 
advantage in some activities and comparative or competitive disadvantage in other 
activities. Note that R2 is overshooted since the equation is estimated without an intercept 
as individual branches are assumed to have their own intercept. It was necessary to force 
the branch neutral equation through zero in order to get a supply curve with a positive 
slope. But the procedure of excluding the intercept has the implication that R2 is 
redefined. The real R2 (when including the intercept) lies around 0.60 for the supply 
curve.  (Something to do with the price used in tobacco??) 
 
After running the standard equation for national communities in food processing the 
attempt is to localise the spillovers in order to understand more about the underlying 
catalysts and vehicles of these spillovers. Equation 2 shows such attempt. In a way, 
however, equation 2 is even a stronger generalisation than equation 1. Generalisation is 
stronger because equation 2 tests for general spillovers from foreign firms no matter their 
branch affiliation. This has some unintentional effects on the stability of the equation. 
Several parameters such as the one for price and time trend change too much. The 
problem is that the change in specification of spillover variables may have introduced 
noise in the form of multicollinearity.  For example, foreign owned firms may be 
concentrated in particular high value added branches, charging above average prices per 
unit of account. Or the foreign owned firsm may be exporting such a large share of their 
produce that they do not respond to Polish retail prices in the same way as Polish firms 
do. But one important result is obtained from equation 2: that the introduction of physical 
space appears to lift the explanatory power away from the national aggregate horizontal 
output variable to the same variable, but specified with the limitation of the regional 
affiliation of the firm.  
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With equation 3, further restrictions are introduced, implying among other that the 
general equation starts to behave normally anew. At the very specific level, and among 
the most commonly theorised spillover catalysts such as multinational firms and 
spillovers in combination we find no impact on the supply curve when pooling 
observations across all firms. Finally, separate supply curves were estimated for the 
foreign and domestic owned groups of firms shown with equations 4 and 5 respectively. 
From these estimates it appears that localised spillovers based on the influence of FDI are 
strongly concentrated among the foreign owned firms themselves. This specification did 
not render any results for the domestic owned group of firms, however, it should be rerun 
with the former more general spillover variables that gave results. Also, it may be 
suspected that inherited networks of the past – that are not necessarily associated with 
geography and instead associated with the older firms could render different results for 
the domestic group of firms.  
 
Next a similar approach was undertaken in the estimation of the production function for 
the same firms. However, the two samples are not exactly identical owing to the 
differences in availability of specific variables. The production function estimates have 
the clear advantage over the supply curve estimates, that labour productivity is a more 
rigorous performance variable than merely output. Further compared with the supply 
curve estimates it is not necessary to assume that firms produce only one type of 
products, or that all firms on average charge the same price for their products. These 
obvious disadvantages in assumptions are avoided by a production function approach. 
But on the other hand, and as mentioned above, the way the production function is 
adopted here has some other types of short-coming, especially because of the lack of 
availability of important information such as value added. Hence the production function 
can only be estimated as an approximation to its real form by using turnover instead of 
value added. 
 
Results for these tests, again following the same logic and steps as above are shown in 
Regression Table 2. Due to the striking similarity in results, and despite the choice of an 
entirely different performance variable (and albeit many of the explanatory variables are 
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the same under the two estimation strategies), most conclusions follow straightforward 
from the above, as the reader may also verify by comparing the results for the spillover 
variables in the two tables. The major difference between results in Regression Tables 1 
and 2 is the fact that aggregate horizontal turnover at the national level is not an 
important explanatory variable towards labour productivity at the firm-level. 
 
REG. TABLE 2: Production function estimation (OLS)     
Dependent variable is firm-level labour productivity: log Y/L 
 
   EQ 1  EQ 2  EQ 3  EQ 4  EQ 5 
Explaining variables:       (FOR=1)             (FOR=0) 
INTERCEPT  7.240  3.862  7.280  1.320  7.541 
   (11.43)  (3.44)  (11.45)  (1.51)  (9.35) 
log KAP/LAB RAT 0.240  0.206  0.239  0.144  0.222 
   (14.03)  (12.95)  (13.98)  (4.64)  (11.41) 
log LABOUR  -0.272  -0.360  -0.272  -0.426  -0.303 
   (-13.68)  (-18.99)  (-13.71)  (-13.37)  (-12.73) 
NEW FIRM (D)  0.090  0.087  0.055  0.355  0.033 
   (1.75)  (1.83)  (1.00)  (3.47)  (0.53) 
log AGE  -0.070  -0.095  -0.077  -0.062  -0.071 
   (-1.91)  (-2.80)  (-2.08)  (-0.91)  (-1.71) 
log AGE2  0.162  0.190  0.173  0.191  0.161 
   (2.24)  (2.83)  (2.37)  (1.63)  (1.93) 
FOREIGN (D)  0.355  0.269  0.368  -  - 
   (8.57)  (7.00)  (7.74)   
BRANCH TURNOVER -0.149  -0.063  -0.151  -0.010  -0.155 
   (-3.61)  (-1.65)  (-3.66)  (-0.19)  (-2.97) 
TIME TREND   0.049  0.023  0.047  0.011  0.045 
   (4.62)  (1.54)  (4.48)  (0.75)  (3.71) 
 
REGIONS (D15)  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
BRANCHES (D29) YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
             
Turnover concentration variables (localised spillover proxies): 
 
FOR-REG  -  -0.011  -  -  - 
     (-0.23) 
NEW-REG  -  -0.036  -  -  - 
     (-0.49) 
REG-BRA  -  0.303  -  -  - 
     (18.84) 
FOR-REG-BRA  -  -  -0.002  0.460  -0.009 
       (-0.59)  (15.08)  (-2.15) 
NEW-REG-BRA  -  -  0.008  -0.007  0.010 
       (1.83)  (-0.91)  (1.99)  
R2   0.48  0.56  0.48  0.77  0.44 
N   2112  2112  2112  437  1675  
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The difference may also owe to that by using the production function approach the effect 
running counter to the spillover effect through the price mechanism is left uncontrolled 
for. But when going to the more specific level it is clear that the results are identical. 
Again it appears that physical space is what in particular matters for all types of firms in 
terms of catalysing spillovers. But the presence of foreign owned firms have little 
positive effect on the performance of domestic owned firms. Finally, there is again found 
clear indication of strong spillovers among a geographicly confined community of 
foreign producers. 
 
7. Regional policy 
Regional differences are currently one of the major developmental problems in Poland’s 
transition process to a market economy (UNDP, 2002). Therefore, invitations to foreign 
investors towards purchasing old or establishing new firms in Poland, have often been 
combined with policies aiming at redistribution between the social classes and between 
Poland’s highly disparate regions. The regional GDP per capita level is shown in Figure 
1. In a regional policy perspective the food industry is strategic to the Polish economy 
since it is very much decentralised when looking at the industry as a whole. Furthermore, 
it holds the long-term promise of modernising and upgrading Polish agriculture. Many 
regions can potentially benefit from Poland becoming a country with strong comparative 
advantage and important value added activities in food processing. One major barrier to 
the development of the food industry is the difficult access to markets outside the CEE 
region both because of restrictive EU policies concerning market access and the impact 
the Russian crisis had on Polish exports. There are therefore many hopes that foreign 
investors can aid both in solving problems of upgrading the food processing industries, 
agricultural production methods and improving market access for Polish food products. 
The immediate aim is, however, typically employment creation in the poorer regions. So 
despite the lack of spillovers there may be a direct employment and export argument for 
attracting foreign investors. But is the creation of employment and exports sufficient to 
offer large tax rebates to foreign investors and how large are these rebates really? 
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FIGURE 1: GDP per capita by region, EU15=100         
             
Source:  EUROSTAT (2002): ‘Regional GDP per capita in the EU and the 
candidate countries in 1999’, EUROSTAT news release, STAT/02/13, 
Statistical Office of the European Union, Brussels. 
 
A central tool in regional policy has been the creation of 15 special economic zones 
(SEZs) outside the main cities and industrial zones of Warsaw and Poznan. Almost every 
region today proud itself of a special economic zone that aims to attract foreign investors 
through particular benefits such as 10-20 years of tax holidays if certain targets are being 
met typically formulated as investment and/or employment targets. The individual 
regional government sets the particular targets. Such favourable tax policy is a short-term 
policy tool, unique to the SEZs and only temporary, since EU membership will imply that 
new tax holidays no longer can be negotiated. Table 5 shows the economic zones, their 
date of creation and the amount of FDI attracted. As is clear from the Table, there is 
today so many special economic zones that they tend to out-compete one another in their 
quest for FDI. As a consequence three of the more recently established SEZs have 
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already been terminated since they failed to attract any foreign investments. The most 
successful have been the earliest SEZs with a particular profile at the outset or having 
evolved towards specialisation in certain industries or activities.  
 
TABLE 5: Special economic zones in Poland      
 
Zone     Opening date FDI, mln PLN1/ Specialisation  
 
Mielec, Podkarpackie   June, 1995 1,400  Hi-tech   
Suwalki, Podlaskie   Sept, 1996 375  Environment, SMEs  
Katowice, Slaskie   1996  3,279  Cars   
Legnica Dolnoslaskie   April, 1997 812  New industry  
Lodz, Lodzskie    April, 1997 348  Chemicals, Food 
Walbrzych, Dolnoslaskie   April, 1997 375  New industry 
Krakow, Malopolskie   Sept, 1997 23  Hi-tech 
Kamienna Gora, Dolnoslaskie  Sept, 1997 16  None 
Kostrzyn-Slubice, Lubuskie  Sept, 1997 240  None (on German border) 
Slupsk, Pomorskie   Sept, 1997 12  Food, Trad. industry 
Starachowice, Swietokrzyskie  Sept, 1997 38  Engineering 
Tarnobrzeg, Podkarpackie   1997  183  Engineering, Metals 
Tczew, Pomorskie   1997  247  Food, Engineering  
Olsztyn, Warminsko- Mazurskie  1997  25  Food, Wood, Electronics 
Zarnowiec, Pomorskie   1997  31  None    
1: As of third quarter 2001 
2: At the end of 2000          
Source: Internet homepages of the Polish SEZs, UNIDO (2001): How to do  
business in Poland 2001, United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization, Warsaw. 
 
Some SEZs are also specialised in food processing. Cost- and natural resource-seeking 
greenfield investors in food processing are an obvious target to all these SEZs since they have 
important incentives to operate locally and especially when they source their inputs in Poland. 
Oppositely are multinational firms, specialised in differentiated food products, who mainly seek 
markets for their established products in Poland, less likely to locate outside the larger hubs of 
Poznan and Warsaw. As was mentioned already in Section 4, up to 50% of all investments in 
food processing are concentrated among these hubs that are also Poland’s most highly populated 
regions. 
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TABLE 6: Paid in taxes by region and ownership      
OBS:  Mean   Average taxes per employee, current prices, PLN, 1995-2000 
(SD) 
 
Region / Voivod   Domestic owned firms Foreign owned firms      Joint ventures 
 
1 Zachodnio-pomorskie   104:  1,553  14:  3,492  5:  324 
Capital: Szczecin    (3,180)   (3,762)   (641) 
2. Pomorskie    87:  8,941  23:  3,492  1:  0 
Capital: Gdansk    (38,923)   (4,509)    
3. Warminsko-mazurksie   53:  1,861  16:  6,844  7:  2,802 
Capital: Olsztyn    (7,276)   (16,954)   (3,827) 
4. Podlaskie    37:  8,286  9:  1,833  0 
Capital: Bialystok   (20,310)   (3,937)    
5. Lubuskie    54:  4,843  10:  2,668  0 
Capital: Zielona Gora   (9,375)   (2,031) 
6. Wielkopolskie    198:  4,650  99:  13,039  0 
Capital: Poznan    (14,271)   (18,282) 
7. Kujawsko-pomorskie   166:  3,643  28:  6,453  0 
Capital: Torun    (10,175)   (6,128) 
8. Mazowieckie    260:  7,101  106:  12,880  2:  2,152 
Capital: Warsaw    (45,877)   (30,029)   (3,979) 
9. Dolnoslaskie    120:  2,922  10:  961   0 
Capital: Wroclaw   (13,980)   (2,086) 
10. Lodzkie    120:  3,200  13:  551   5:  11,121 
Capital: Lodz    (5,731)   (1,258)   (9,683) 
11. Lubelskie    106:  1,630  14:  22,420  0 
Capital: Lublin    (2,615)   (21,574) 
12. Opolskie    57:  2,452  13:  5,106  0 
Capital: Opole    (3,604)   (5,950) 
13. Slaskie    140:  3,475  9:  565   5:  26,363 
Capital: Katowice   (8,138)   (1,168)   (12,713) 
14. Swietokrzyskie   40:  1,073  7:  717   0 
Capital: Kielce    (2,337)   (1,897    
15. Podkarpackie   68:  2,180  20:  -73   0 
Capital: Rzeszow   (3,914)   (2,870) 
16. Malopolskie    72:  2,638  35:  6,633  0 
Capital: Krakow    (3,548)   (8,864)      
Source:  Amadeus. 
 
Table 6 demonstrates the consequences of the tax rebates given to foreign investors in the 
SEZs on their tax profile for the Amadeus sample. The relative tax contribution of 
domestic and foreign owned firms is measured in terms of paid in taxes per employee. 
The poorer regions with SEZs are clearly also those that receive the least tax 
contributions from foreign investors, with the most extreme example being Podkarpackie 
that receives on average a negative tax contribution from foreign investors and the most 
from domestic firms. Oppositely do regions without SEZs benefit from an on average 
much higher tax contribution because of FDI. Meaning that despite clauses of equal 
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treatment, it does not in practice result in equal taxation. Hereby, firms from the poorer 
regions are also placed in circumstances of unfair competition, simply because they came 
before the local SEZ. Based on the sample it does not appear that the regions offering tax 
concessions have been more successful in attracting foreign investors, neither compared 
to the hubs of Poznan and Warsaw nor to other poorer regions without SEZs. 
Furthermore, the latest regional employment statistics (see Appendix Table A2) suggest 
that outside the major hubs, unemployment is a general problem, rather than a problem 
isolated to particular regions in Poland.  
 
Ex-post it is hence difficult to see reasonable political arguments for allowing tax 
concessions of this order to foreign investors. At the same time the regional policy may 
have had unintended effects of a much graver kind, since foreign investors because of 
this policy may become geographicly isolated from other Polish firms performing similar 
activities. In the SEZs it is much more likely that foreign owned firms become integrated 
into a community of equals – meaning foreign owned firms located for the same reasons 
in the same regional hub. Such regional policy that aims singularly to offer tax 
concessions without any performance criteria aiming at spillover effects, except very 
standard employment targets, may hence be one of the most direct causes of the poor 
performance of foreign investors towards creating spillovers in the Polish food 
processing industry. 
 
8. Preliminary conclusions 
The objective with the paper was to test for the presence of spillovers in the food 
industry, determine where spillovers are localized and discuss why there may be barriers 
to certain types of spillovers and how such possible barriers can be overcome.  
 
Results so far indicate that there are spillovers, but that the spillovers may not be 
catalysed by the presence of multinational firms as normally assumed in both the 
theoretical and empirical literature on spillovers in developing and transition countries. 
So far, robust results and hence reliable conclusions have only been reached on the 
absence of horizontal spillovers from multinational to domestic firms. Initial results 
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suggest that inherited networks and in particular combined with physical space are the 
most dominant causes of spillovers in Polish food processing. However, the 
methodologically more challenging question about spillovers in vertical linkages has yet 
to be approached. 
 
The paper has also identified several reasons for lack of spillovers between global and 
local actors in the Polish food industry. A major factor may be the lack of shared 
language in interaction between foreign and domestic firms. Other possible barriers could 
owe to particular policy and practices among multinational firms, or resistance to change 
and lack of desire to learn in the former state owned firms. But also the location strategy 
of Greenfield investors may matter due to the importance of geography for interaction 
and hence the presence of spillovers. There is a tendency for foreign investors to locate in 
proximity to other foreign investors. The regional policy and especially towards attracting 
FDI to the SEZs of Poland has several drawbacks which may be a direct cause of the dual 
nature of the present communities of firms in Polish food processing. However, the 
possible influence of such type of barriers was not tested for with the regressions. 
Therefore, results are also too preliminary to give any final recommendations on how to 
solve the problems identified. 
 
To the author’s knowledge, this paper is the first one to present a systematic statistical 
analysis of the impact of FDI on the geography and spillovers of the food industry in 
CEE. Given the importance attached to FDI for restructuring and industrial upgrading by 
the transition countries more research on FDI and how it affects both national and 
regional economic development seems to be needed. Furthermore, it is important to 
continuously follow development in industries having received large amounts of FDI in 
order to better understand the circumstances under which spillovers and hence virtuous 
circles of economic development are likely to take place. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1: Information about retail prices used in estimations    
Branch   Product stereotype Unit of account  Retail price, PLN, 2000 
 
1511-Meat  Pork meat  Kilo   13.49 
1512-Poultry  Disembowelled chicken Kilo   5.76 
1513-Meat and Poultry Pork ham, boiled  Kilo   18.89 
1520-Fish  Fresh or frozen cod Kilo   9.37 
1531-Potatoes  Potatoes   Kilo   0.74 
1532-Fruit  Apple juice  Litre    3.33 
1533-Fruit and Vegetables Green peas, canned Kilo   4.77 
1543-Margarine  Margarine ‘Palma’ Kilo   4.88 
1551-Dairy prod.  Cow’s milk  Litre   2.15 
1552-Ice cream  Fruit yoghurt  Litre   5.48 
1560-Milling  Wheat flour  Kilo   1.60 
1561-Grain mill products Wheat flour  Kilo   1.60 
1562-Starch products Potato starch  Kilo   3.62 
1571-Prep.animal feeds Wheat flour  Kilo   1.60 
1572-Pet foods  Liver sausage  Kilo   6.60 
1581-Bread and pastry Wheat-rye bread  Kilo   2.38 
1582-Biscuits and pastry Doughnut  Kilo   7.80 
1583-Sugar  White sugar, crystallized Kilo   2.97 
1584-Chocolate  Milk chocolate  Kilo   23.2 
1585-Macaroni  Egg macaroni  Kilo   8.25 
1586-Tea and coffee ‘Tchibo Family’  Kilo   26.88 
1587-Condiments Natural black pepper Kilo   82.5 
1588-Dietic food  Homogenised cheese Kilo   9.33 
1589-Other products nes Tomato puree  Kilo   12.14 
1591-Dist. Alcohol Pure vodka ‘polonaise’ Litre   49.24    
1592-Ethyl alcohol Pure vodka ‘polonaise Litre   49.24 
1593-Wine  White grape wine  Litre   12.10 
1594-Cider  White grape wine  Litre   12.10 
1595-Fermented beverages Pure vodka ‘polonaise’ Litre   49.24 
1596-Beer  Beer, full light  Litre   5.22 
1597-Malt  Beer, full light  Litre   5.22 
1598-Mineral water Juice ‘Bobofruit’   Litre   8.34 
1600-Tobacco  Cigarettes ‘Caro’  Carton   37    
Source:  EFFECT/GUS. 
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TABLE A2: Regional unemployment rates in Poland, 1999-2000   
 
Region    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 
Dolnoslaskie       13.8 22.5 24.1 
Kujawsko-Pomorskie      15.2 18.1 21.8 
Lubelskie       12.6 13.7 14.7 
Lubuskie       15.3 21.3 23.6 
Lodzkie        12.7 16.2 19.6 
Malopolskie       9.7 11.7 12.8 
Mazowieckie       9.1 13.2 14.2 
Opolskie       12.1 14.5 19.1   
Podkarpackie       16.1 14.4 17.5 
Poldaskie       11.4 15.7 15.7 
Pomorskie       13.0 17.1 18.0 
Slaskie        9.7 18.9 20.4 
Switorkrzyskie       15.6 16.9 20.0 
Warminsko-Mazurskie      21.3 22.5 22.3 
Wielkopolskie       9.8 14.1 19.0 
Zachodniopomorskie      14.9 20.5 21.5   
Source:  EUROSTAT (2002): ‘Unemployment in the EU and the Central European 
candidate countries’, EUROSTAT news release, No. 93/2002 – 5 August 
2002, Statistical Office of the European Union, Brussels. 
 
 
